Abstract-Denial of Service attacks are becoming an increasing threat to our information infrastructure. By exploiting vulnerability in existing protocols and infrastructures, malicious attackers consume resources in networks and servers to block or degrade the service to legitimate users. TCP is the dominant network transport protocol. It relies on the participating hosts' cooperation to make data transmission successful. This kind of trust has been exploited in some DoS attacks, such as SYN-flooding attack. In this paper, we investigate how a TCP client can extend the duration of its connection with a server only by setting the pace of sending back acknowledgement packets. Our study shows that the duration of a TCP connection could be extended tens of times without incurring timeout retransmission. This mechanism can potentially be used by attackers to launch DoS attacks by generating simultaneous prolonged TCP connections with the victim servers. Unlike SYN-flooding attacks, the low rate property of slow TCP connections makes the detection of this kind of attack difficult, which calls for a further study on this issue.
I. INTRODUCTION
Denial of service attacks aim at consuming targets' resources, such as network bandwidth, server CPU time, TCP connections, etc., to block or degrade services to legitimate users. One way to occupy resource is to generate requests at very high rate [4] [8] [17] . For example, SYN-flooding attack relies on large volume of requesting packets to overwhelm the target. A lot of researches on how to handle SYNflooding attack have been carried out and they work very well in mitigating SYN-flooding effect [3] [16] [15] [13] [18] .
Recently, [6] studies the effect of retransmission timeout on the traffic, especially that at the close-to-saturate link, and proposes a novel low rate DoS attack. The attackers inject bursts of traffic into the network. Traffic bursts saturate links traversed by victim TCP connections and cause losses of TCP packets in burst. By synchronizing those bursts with TCP timeout retransmission, attackers manage to keep legitimate TCP connections in timeout stage, therefore completely or significantly degrade their throughput. The duration of attacking burst is set to be very short so that the average rate of the attacker's traffic is low.
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how a client can stretch its connection by slowing down TCP data transmission rate. By doing that, the client can occupy a large number of TCP connections available at the server with low traffic rate, which makes the rate-based detection difficult. This is in contrary to most research on TCP which has been focused on how to increase its throughput and decrease the download latency [12] . The purpose of our work is to point out the vulnerabilities in current TCP protocols and hopefully draw more attention on the study of TCP in the context of security.
TCP is the dominant network transport protocol, and essentially a close-loop control protocol. Its operation largely depends on the collaboration and trust between the server and the client. The server relies on the client's feedback, in the form of acknowledgement, to adjust its sending rate. This provides the possibility for the client to control the server's sending rate by simply manipulating the pace of sending back acknowledgement packets.
We first demonstrate the feasibility of extending TCP connection duration by increasing its round trip time. This is achieved by introducing artificial delays through a network emulator between the client and the server. Then, we present a detailed study on how a client can deliberately delay acknowledgement packets to throttle down its connection's sending rate and extend the duration of the connection.
We investigate to what extent a TCP connection can be stretched so that it still appears to the server a "normal" connection. We focus on the case where the client greedily stretches its connection, and in the same time tries to avoid TCP timeout at the server. While TCP timeout helps to prolong connections, frequent timeouts could alert the server's intrusion detection system. Therefore the server's TCP timeout value serves as an upper bound of the delay the client can put on acknowledgement packets. Fortunately (unfortunately), in order to deal with heterogeneity and randomness in networks, TCP reserves a large margin in its retransmission timeout value. We will present client-end algorithm to estimate and largely stretch the retransmission timeout value at the server end under different network situations. Our NS-2 simulations show that the durations of TCP connections can be stretched tens of times without triggering timeout retransmission. We also show through experiments that legitimate users would suffer if multiple slow TCP connections are initiated toward the server.
Slow TCP connections are "well-suited" in low rate DoS attacks. To guarantee performance, web servers set up a limit on the number of concurrent connections. An attacker can launch a large number of low rate TCP connections, either from one machine or a cluster of compromised machines, to use up connections available at the server. Unlike traditional high rate DoS attack, the low traffic rate property of this type of attacks makes them more difficult for routers and traffic monitors to detect. Although we present several possible solutions, we believe the trust built in TCP protocol is the source of this kind of attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II demonstrates the feasibility of extending TCP duration by introducing additional delay in round trip time. In Section III, we study how to extend the TCP connection by controlling acknowledgement packets without incurring timeout retransmission. Section IV shows that a legitimate user could suffer from those slow TCP connections. In Section V we study the feasibility of slow TCP in denial of service attack and its possible solutions. Section VI concludes this paper.
II. EXTENDED ROUND TRIP TIME AND ITS EFFECT ON DURATION OF CONNECTION
TCP protocol provides reliable data transmission to application layer. The resources involved in data transmission include those in transport layer and application layer. We emphasize the protection on the resources in application layer is very important. Our experiment shows the resource at the server could be occupied longer if data transmission is extended by a delay component introduced between client and server.
A. Data Transmission: Resource Consumption at Transport and Application Layer
After three-way handshake, the server starts to transmit data from application layer to transport layer. From this time till the connection is torn down, the operating system at the server has to allocate resource for application layer. This resource has a limit. For example, the default value for maximum clients served simultaneously in Apache server is 150 [14] .
If the data transmission is extended, the related resource at the server, in both transport and application layers, would be occupied longer. We will first examine whether a server would stand with extended data transmission or not. The following experiment shows that a delay component between the client and the server could result in longer TCP connection and longer serving time in web server.
B. Experimental Study: TCP Connection Extended by Artificial Delay
The following experiment is to clear the doubt on whether real TCP implementation and the applications built on it would allow long round trip time. The experiment will make clear the effect of extended round trip time on the duration of TCP connection and serving time of the application.
The experiment setting in Fig. 1 consists of one server and two clients. All computers run Linux operating system. The server is installed with Apache software [14] to provide web service. A software called NIST NET [9] is installed in client1 to introduce delay from server to client1. Every packet from server to client1 would first feed into NIST NET and then NIST NET passes packet to client1 after the specific delay, while the packets from client1 to server would directly propagate to server. The delay introduced by NIST NET increases round trip time between server and client1. In our experiment, we configure the delay introduced by NIST NET from 0 to 12 sec, with 1 sec as one step. For each delay, a 200 KB file at the server is retrieved repeatedly 20 times to have the average of the result.
We record the duration of TCP connection at client1 and get the serving time at the server from the web log file. Fig. 2 shows the experiment result for the case with file size of 200 KB. In Fig. 2 , the duration of TCP connection increases as round trip time increases. So does the serving time at the server. Note a gap exists between the duration at the client end and the serving time at the server end. This is mostly due to the first several SYN packets and the last several FIN packets, since the serving time would only record the time the web server takes over and processes the data.
III. DATA TRANSMISSION EXTENDED BY MANIPULATING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT PACKET
We present the objective and assumption of this section, and use TCP implementation in BSD UNIX [20] as an example to show how the client manipulates acknowledgement packets to extend TCP connection without incurring retransmission timeout at the server. Finally, we have a discussion on the variants of TCP implementation.
A. Objective and Assumption
The objective of this section is to study how long a TCP connection could be extended by the client controlling acknowledgement packet transmissions, given no timeout retransmission occurs at the server. In order to make extended TCP connection look normal to the server, an attacker would prefer that each TCP connection experiences its three stages and the round trip time should be adjusted gracefully. Therefore, the client would adjust the pace of acknowledgement packets within the range of retransmission timeout at the server. To simplify our study, we introduce the following assumptions:
• The client acknowledges each packet from the server.
No loss happens to the acknowledgement packets.
• The propagation delay from the client to the server is the same as that from the server to the client.
• The TCP behavior is described in terms of "rounds".
A round starts when the server begins the transmission of a window of packets and ends when it receives an acknowledgement for one or more of these packets.
B. TCP Operations
We give a brief description of the calculation of round trip time and retransmission timeout, the operation of RTT timer and RTO timer.
1) Round Trip Time, Retransmission Timeout:
To ensure smooth operation of data transmission, TCP relies on the following three parameters: smoothed round trip time srtt, smoothed mean deviation rttvar of srtt and retransmission timeout RT O. The calculation of srtt and RT O could be summarized by the following equations:
where rtt is the measured round trip time. The initial values of srtt, rttvar and RT O are 0s, 3s, 6s. srtt, rttvar and thus RT O are updated whenever the ACK packet for a timed data packet arrives.
2) Operation of RTT and RTO Timer:
In BSD version [20] , RTT and RTO timers work as follows:
• When TCP transmits a data packet, if the RTT timer and RTO timer are not used, this data packet will be timed, otherwise, the data packet would not be timed.
• Only one RTT timer and one RTO timer are available for a TCP connection.
• If there are unacknowledged data packets, one of them will be timed by the RTO timer.
• When TCP detects duplicate ACKs and a fast retransmission is initiated, RTT and RTO timers are reset to time this retransmitted data packet, even they are being used to time other data packets.
C. Round Trip Time Extended through Acknowledgement Packet Controlling
From server point of view, the round trip time is the interval between when the server sends the data packet and when the server gets the ACK packet. It consists of three parts: the propagation time from the server to the client, the processing time at the client, and the propagation time from the client to the server. The calculation of round trip time at the server depends on acknowledgement packets from the client. No mechanism in TCP protocol could identify each component of round trip time. The client could control the pace of acknowledgement packet, in particular, hold the acknowledgement packet to increase the round trip time.
Our study is focused on how the client could introduce artificial delay to increase round trip time gracefully and extend the TCP connection without incurring timeout retransmission. This is possible due to the following factors: (1) The client could measure the propagation delay from the time stamp of data packets; (2) The client knows whether data packet gets lost or not earlier than the server; (3) The client knows TCP algorithms in updating srtt, rttvar and RT O and can predict those values at server end.
1) TCP with Extended Round Trip Time and No Packet Loss:
To extend the duration of TCP connection without incurring timeout retransmission, the client needs to know how much artificial delay should be introduced for each acknowledgement packet. Before making the decision, the client needs to know the value of RT O at the server. The client will have to keep an estimate of all the related parameters used in the server.
TCP protocol transmits data packets in the unit of round. The related parameters rtt, srtt, rttvar and RT O are updated round by round. To have an estimate of those parameters locally, the client needs to estimate those parameters each round. We use c rtt [i] 
In the case when there is no packet loss, only the first data packet in each round is timed. The client would need the sequence number of the first data packet of each round, so that it could introduce new artificial delay, and update the corresponding parameters for next round. If we do not consider the limit of slow start threshold and advertised window size, the timed packets are those data packets with sequence number 2 n − 1, while n = 0, 1, 2.... For the case with given slow start threshold and advertised window size, the sequence numbers of timed data packets can also be calculated accordingly. Another way to infer the timed packets without looking at packet sequence number is presented in the technical report [2] . Once the client identifies packets timed by the server, the procedure of updating the estimate of those c parameters could be described as follows:
• When the first data packet arrives at the client, the client needs to decide how much artificial delay it will introduce before sending back the acknowledgement packet. The client knows the initial value of RTO at the server is 6s, i.e, c RT O(0) = 6. Therefore, the client would introduce artificial delay time delay [0] for data packet of this round:
where τ is the margin to make the round trip time of each packet smaller than RT O, rtt 0 is the propagation time from server to the client, which can be estimated by the client by taking the difference between a packet's arrival time at the client end and its time stamp put by the server. Then rtt [0] , the round trip time seen by the server, can be estimated as:
• Once the server gets the acknowledgement for the first packet, it would initialize the values of srtt, rttvar and update RT O. The client could update its estimate on these parameters:
Then, when the client receives the second round of packets from the server, it could apply the artificial Table I shows the trend of c RT O [i] in the first 5 rounds of data transmission. In 5 rounds, c RT O could reach 64sec, which is MAX RT O in BSD TCP implementation [20] . Thus for large-size data transmission, the duration of the connection could be extended by MAX RT O/rtt 0 times. For small-size data transmission which finishes in a couple of rounds, Table I shows the duration of the connection could be greatly extended as well.
2) TCP with Extended Round Trip Time and Moderate Data Packet Loss:
In reality, packets are lost from time to time in the network. It is common for a TCP connection to experience some packet loss during its life-time. In [2] , we present a client algorithm to stretch TCP connection when there is moderate packet loss. That is to say we only study the case where at most one packet will be dropped each round. Under this assumption, the server would receive duplicate ACKs for each lost packet. Duplicate ACKs would trigger fast retransmission and fast recovery algorithm [20] . From the duplicated ACKs, the server could infer which data packet is lost, and retransmit it. At the same time, the server will reset the RTT timer and RTO timer to measure this retransmitted data packet. The client will have to detect this retransmission and synchronize its calculation with the server's option. The algorithm presented in Section III-C.1, which uses the sequence number to infer those timed packets, no longer works in this scenario. The client must have a new algorithm to detect timed packets, including both the first packet of each new round and the retransmitted packets. We refer the interested readers to [2] for the details.
3) Simulation: We implement the mechanism above to control acknowledgement packet in TCP/Sink in NS simulator [10] . A detailed algorithm to track the timed packets, calculate artificial delay time and update the estimate of the parameters is presented in Technical Report [2] . A simulation with two nodes (a server with TCP/Reno, and a client with TCP/Sink) is setup to study how much the duration of TCP connection could be extended by our mechanism. The link connecting these two nodes has 5Mb bandwidth and 400ms delay. The advertised window size is the default value in NS. A ftp flow is setup between the server and the client. The amount of data from the server to the client is changed from 1 to 5000. The experiments are carried out for the two cases: no data packet loss and packet loss with loss rate 0.002.
We use experiments to compare normal TCP connection with slow TCP connection. Fig. 3 shows the simulation result. x-axis represents the number of data packet the ftp flow wants to send from the server to the client. y-axis represents the duration of TCP connection in Log scale. Fig. 3 shows the case when the link allows data packet loss 1 . There is a gap between the duration of normal TCP connection and that of slow TCP connection. This gap increases at the beginning and converges to certain value, i.e, the ratio of the duration of slow TCP connection over that of normal TCP connection increases and converges to a constant when the number of data packets transmitted increases. Table I shows the extended round trip time could become very close to MAX RT O in a couple of rounds, and thus the ratio of the duration between slow TCP connection and normal TCP connection would be approximated by MAX RT O/rtt 0 ∼ = 64/0.8 = 80. This trend has been reflected in Fig. 3 .
In summary, our simulation result shows the duration of slow TCP connection is tens of times as long as that of normal TCP connection.
D. Discussion on Variants of TCP Implementation
Since RFC does not specify the detailed implementation of TCP, the implementation in different operating systems varies. However, this does not change the fact that the client could control the pacing of acknowledgement packets. For example, "TimeStamp" option [5] is introduced to make the measurement of RTT easier and could be encrypted by the server, nevertheless, the client could still hold the data packet for the delay before it begins to process the data packet. 1 We refer the interested readers to our technical report [2] for the case when there is no loss in the link. In this section, we present a study on how a normal user could be affected by slow TCP connections. The web server has a limit on the number of clients it can serve simultaneously. In Apache web server, this number is reflected in the directive MaxClients in the configuration file [14] . When a web file request arrives, if the number of clients served by web server is less than MaxClients, the request is served right away; otherwise, the request has to wait until some clients being served finish.
The experiments use the computer setting in Fig. 1 . A simple scenario is used to show a normal user could be affected by slow TCP connections. Client1 always has 2 * MaxClients connections. Client2 would always have one normal TCP connection. All TCP connections are to retrieve a 200KB file from the server. Therefore, the server would always have MaxClients requests being served, and MaxClients + 1 requests in the queue waiting for service. Therefore, the single request from Client2 will experience the average delay introduced by the long service time of slow TCP connections. Fig. 4 shows 19 samples of the delay experienced by the normal user at the client end. The normal user experiences about 80-100sec delay, which is closed to the delay introduced by Client1 in Fig. 2 . In summary, with multiple slow TCP connections to request web file from web server, the normal user would experience similar delay like slow TCP connections.
V. DOS ATTACK WITH SLOW TCP CONNECTIONS AND ITS POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Slow TCP connections can be used by malicious users to launch denial of service attacks to web servers. For a server, the number of the connections for specific application is limited. If malicious users establish many slow TCP connections with the server and once the number of connections reaches the maximum value, legitimate users will be totally blocked out. 
A. Denial of Service Attack Using Slow TCP Connections
From an attacker's point of view, slow TCP connection has the following properties suitable to denial of service attack: (1) A slow TCP connection behaves like a "normal" TCP connection: three-stage connection, no frequent timeout retransmissions, low traffic rate. (2) Since each slow TCP connection can last for a long time, a moderate request rate is sufficient to overwhelm a server. This reduces the cost of DoS attacks in compromising a large number of machines.
The only abnormal symptom of slow TCP is its long round trip time. However, the server has to be robust to allow a large range of round trip time. Due to dramatic variation of traffic conditions and the heterogeneity in networks, round trip time varies a lot. The past and recent studies [11] [1] show TCP round trip time has great variability. Recent study observes RTTs range from 1 ms to more than 200 s. Without additional mechanism, the sever would not be able to tell whether the client manipulates acknowledgement packet to control round trip time or not.
Recently controlling traffic at the client end is proposed to deal with DDoS flooding attack [7] . When the edge router detects a DDoS attack, it will control the rate of flows. Therefore, some artificial delay is introduced into the flow. This has made it valid to delay traffic deliberately. In our study, we emphasize that the duration of TCP connection could be extended tens of times by slow TCP connections, which involves with low volume of traffic. Varied durations of slow TCP connections could be introduced to make the detection of this kind of attack more difficult.
B. Possible Solutions and Their Limitation
Two major factors contribute to the application of slow TCP in DoS attacks: the low data transmission rate and the trust inherent in TCP protocol. People could propose the possible solutions as follows: increase server's capacity, disconnect slow TCP connection, track the round trip time between the server and the neighboring hosts of the client, use Haboob web servers [19] . In [2] , we point out the difficulties in the possible solutions. This suggests a further study is needed on how to solve the denial of service by client-controlled slow TCP.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we present a mechanism for web clients to control the sending rate of web servers just by manipulating the pace of acknowledgement packets. We show that the duration of TCP connection can be slowed down and its duration can be stretched by tens of times. Those stretched slow TCP connections can possibly be used in denial of service attacks to web servers. Slow TCP connections behave like normal TCP connections. This makes the detection of such attacks difficult. Our study calls for more attention on the study of TCP in the context of security. We hope this work could help demonstrate once again that the Internet security needs to be reviewed as a whole, and starts from the basic assumptions and architecture principles.
